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ARGUMENT
The trial court failed to make sufficiently detailed findings to support its
decisions regarding alimony, the division of debts and assets, and the award of
attorneys' fees. The trial court also erred by failing to award Respondent Linda Madsen
("Linda") a judgment for unpaid alimony. As further discussed below, there is no
logical connection between evidence that was presented and findings that were made at
the trial on these issues. As set forth repeatedly in Utah cases
"the trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings of fact on each
factor [referring to the Jones factors for alimony] to enable a reviewing
court to ensure that the trial court's discretionary determination was
rationally based upon these three factors. If sufficient findings are not
made, we must reverse unless the record is clear and uncontroverted such
as to allow us to apply the Jones factors as a matter of law on appeal."
Bell, 810 P.2d at 491-92. This principle of the need for adequate findings relates to all
factual issues, not only alimony determinations. In this case, the trial court failed to
make sufficient findings in the face of disputed and contrary evidence to "enable a
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reviewing court to ensure that the trial court's discretionary determination was
rationally based".
The Appellee's Brief submitted by Petitioner Raymond Madsen ("Raymond")
essentially makes three arguments: (1) that Linda has failed to marshal the evidence,
and that the trial court should therefore be affirmed; (2) that the trial court considered
the fault of the parties—Linda's fault in particular—and issued the divorce decree on
equitable principles and should therefore be affirmed; and (3) that the trial court has
considerable discretion when determining alimony, property distribution, and attorneys'
fees and should therefore be affirmed.
Each of Raymond's arguments fails. First, the blanket argument that Linda has
not marshaled the evidence is unfounded. Where marshalling is required, Linda has
marshaled the evidence. For example, when the trial court's findings were contrary to
the evidence presented, Linda has marshaled the evidence. But not all bases for appeal
raised by Linda turn on a strict marshalling of the evidence. Marshalling is not the
focus of the inquiry when the trial court abused its discretion by failing to make
findings which are sufficiently detailed to enable the reviewing court to understand the
trial court's reasoning. Linda acknowledges that in the case of inadequate findings, she
must show that the appellate court cannot reach a similar decision based on the
evidence as a matter of law.
Second, Raymond argues that the trial court's ruling was based on the fault of
the parties, particularly Linda's fault. Raymond's brief sets forth his characterization of
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events that took place beft|re the trial but fails to cite to the record to indicate when and
how these characterizations were presented as evidence. Moreover, the trial court made
no findings regarding fault of the parties, and nothing in the record indicates that the
decree was issued based on tault of the parties.
Third, Raymond argues that the trial court has discretion when making these
kinds of decisions and should therefore be affirmed. Although it is true that the trial
court has some discretion in its decisions in a divorce action, the court must still make
sufficiently detailed findings on all material issues to permit review. The abuse of the
trial court's discretion in this case lies in both its erroneous findings and in its failure to
make detailed findings.
Point I
The Trial Cburt Abused its Discretion by Failing to Make
Sufficient Findings of Fact on all Material Issues
A. Linda marshaled the evidence to show that the court mproperly analyzed
alimony in mis case oy comparing her gross income against Petitioner's net
income under the Jones factors.
The record contradicts the trial court's findings of fact as to the incomes of the
parties. When the trial court imputed a monthly income to Linda, based on her
stipulated ability to earn 3J6.50 an hour, which is a gross amount.
Linda testified that she was thinking about applying to two different jobs that
each had a starting pay of $6.50 per hour, and that her most recent job paid $7.00 per
hour. R. at 427, pp. 112-13. Linda also testified that $1,126.67 would be a good
3

estimate of what her monthly gross income would be, based on a job that paid $6.50
per hour. R. at 427, pp. 154-55. It was undisputed by Linda, or by her attorney, that
income should be imputed to Linda at the minimum wage. R. at 427, p. 220.
The trial court's findings and rulings were as follows:
"I have her [Linda's] income at $1,118. That's calculated at $6.50
cents an hour assuming 40 hours a week, 4.3 weeks a month. So $1,118
for her. His income I put at $4,781. That's, that's his net for his
declaration.... I do however find that both of their expenses are overstated.
For her expense declaration I'm going to exclude [some things]
That takes her expenses to $2,718.
With regard to him, I'm going to make some similar calculations
That reduces his expenses to $3,880.
And if I apply those, her income at $1,118, take away her expenses,
leaves a deficit of $1,600. If I take his net income of $4,781, take away
expenses of $3,880, that leaves a surplus of $901. Isn't that an interesting
figure?"
R. at 427, pp. 244-46 (emphasis added); see also Addendum H to Appellant's Brief at
Tflf 10-17; Addendum I to Appellant's Brief atfflj14-21. The trial court erred by using
Linda's gross income amount and Raymond's net income amount to determine the
parties' income and needs.
The trial court calculated $1,118.00 ($6.50 per hour, 40 hours per week, 4.3
weeks per month) as Linda's gross income amount. By calculating Linda's income
figures without taking into account her tax and Social Security liability, the trial court
overstated the income that Linda had available to meet her needs. See Montoya v.
Montoya, 2002 UT App 272, f 1, 2002 WL 1870282. Moreover, this error was
especially prejudicial considering that the trial court used Raymond's net income, and
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not his gross, in its calculations. If we assume a 30% deduction for taxes and Social
Security, the trial court overestimated the funds available to meet Linda's needs by
approximately $335.00. Finally, the trial court had already made clear, in a previous
Order, that "an alimony order should not be based upon the gross income of the parties,
but upon the net income of the parties." See Addendum F to Appellant's Brief at ^ 4.
The court failed to explain in its findings why it improperly and unfairly used Linda's
imputed gross income to determine her needs while using Raymond's net income
(determined to be $4,781.00) to determine his ability to pay alimony.
Similarly, there was an unfair disparity in the determination of the parties'
permitted expenses. When determining alimony, the trial court assumed that the entire
stipulated gross income for Linda would be available to her together with the award of
alimony as disposable income. Therefore, the court did not include any expense for the
payment of taxes, including social security, medicare, state and federal taxes. However,
Raymond's gross income was determined to be $7,197.00 per month and his net income
to be $4,781.00, allowing him $2,416.00 in monthly expenses. Linda has marshaled
the evidence on the issue of disparate treatment of monthly incomes of the parties with
no discussion by the court as to its reasoning. The finding using gross income to
determine Linda's needs limited Linda's need for alimony and left an insufficient
income for her to pay her own monthly taxes.
The trial court erred, and this Court should remand for appropriate findings
related to Linda's income.
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B. Linda marshaled the evidence to show that the trial court improperly court
improperly considered temporary alimony as an ongoing monthly expense for
Raymond
1. Alimony. In this case, the trial court made findings regarding the parties'
incomes and needs. However, the court erred mathematically in calculating the
appropriate award of alimony based upon its findings at trial.
a. Raymond's expenses. At trial, Raymond offered a financial declaration into
evidence. This declaration showed that his monthly expenses were $5,579.93,, R. 428,
Exhibit 5. At paragraph 19 of the findings, the court trims the expenses of Petitioner
apparently relying on Exhibit 5 without referring to Exhibit. R. 428, Exhibit 5.
However, the findings are consistent with the exhibit and the testimony of Petitioner.
The court trimmed the Petitioners expenses by eliminating a deduction for attorneys
fees of $500.00 and for tithing of $700.00. See, e.g., R. at 427, p. 55; Addendum P to
Appellant's Brief at 4. The court also deducts from the Petitioner's expenses, $500.00
for mathematical errors. See, e.g., R. 368, p. 4; Addendum I to Appellant's Brief at 4.
Although the court does not indicate what those errors are, there was testimony that the
claimed car payment of $300.00 a month and the claimed $200.00 monthly schooling
payment were not really expenses that Petitioner had. See, e.g., R. at 427, p. 56,11.4-17;
p. 58,11. 1-9; R. 428, Exhibit 5.
What the court does not deduct from Petitioner's financial declaration is an
expense for previous alimony awards on trial exhibit 5 which contains a list of monthly
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expenses for Petitioner. Raymond testifies that this Exhibit 5 contains his monthly
expenses at page four of the Exhibit and then explains his expenses. See, e.g., R. at
427, p. 52,1. 25 - p. 60,1.11; see also Addendum P to Appellant's Brief at 4.
Raymond indicates that the $900.00 described in Exhibit 5 as "Payment of
child/spousal support re: prior marriage" meant the $900.00 a month spousal support he
was paying at the time of trial "from the temporary order." See, e.g., R. at 427, p. 55,1.
21-25. This entry on Petitioner's report to the court of his monthly expenses was for
support Raymond was paying to Linda under the Temporary Order.
It was an error for the court to consider this $900.00 of temporary support at the
time of trial because temporary support automatically terminates and is replaced by the
permanent order arising out of trial. The effect was to boost Raymond's expenses in
Exhibit 5 from $4,679.93 a month to $5,579.93 a month. See, e.g., R. at 427, p. 55; R.
428, Exhibit 5, p. 4; Addendum P to Appellant's Brief at 4. When the court made
findings to determine the ability to pay alimony, Raymond was essentially given a
$900.00 expense that he would not have to pay following the entry of the divorce
decree—the temporary alimony. See, e.g., R. 428, Exhibit 5, p. 4; Addendum P to
Appellant's Brief at 4; R. 368, p. 4; Addendum I to Appellant's Brief at p. 4.
When the court subtracted unnecessary monthly expenses (tithing, erroneous
expenses and attorneys fees all totaling $1,700.00 a month), the court subtracted these
expenses from the wrong total of $5,579.93 instead of $4,679.93. See, e.g., R. 428,
Exhibit 5, p. 4; Addendum P to Appellant's Brief at 4; R. 368, p. 4; Addendum I to
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Appellant's Brief at p. 4. This resulted in needs of Raymond of $3,880.00 when after
trial, his needs for the allowed expenses would immediately drop to $2,980.00. See,
e.g., R. 428, Exhibit 5, p. 4; Addendum P to Appellant's Brief at 4; R. 368, p. 4;
Addendum I to Appellant's Brief at p. 4. An award of temporary alimony is not an
includable expense under the Jones' factors because it does not continue beyond trial.
If the court had stricken the $900.00 of support from the expenses claimed by
Raymond, the trial court should have found that Raymond had $1,800.00 available to
pay alimony, but instead found that he only had $900.00 available to pay alimony. See,
e.g., R. 368, p. 4; Addendum I, Appellant's Brief at p. 4. Therefore, this issue should
be remanded to the trial court to make the correct calculation of expenses of Raymond
and to adjust alimony to at least $1,800.00 a month due to the increased capacity of
Raymond.
b. The court erred in refusing to amend its findings after
Respondent's timely filed motion.
At first, the miscalculation of Raymond's appeared to have been an oversight by
the court. But when Linda pointed out the error n her Motion to Amend Findings, the
trial court responded that it intentionally added $900.00 to Raymond's expenses to
compensate for the large portion of marital debt that was assigned to Raymond. See,
e.g., R. at 425, p. 21. The court's explanation of its use of the $900.00 is not consistent
with its findings at the time of trial. See, e.g., R. 368, p. 4; Addendum I to Appellant's
Brief at p. 4. Even if this court were to view this new calculation of expenses by the

8

trial court as being within the trial court's discretion, there were insufficient findings to
explain what the trial court meant by its January 3, 2005 finding "I ordered him to pay
off all of the debts and assume all of the debt load. And that had a lot to do with my
intentionally leaving the $900 expense on his, in his expenses". R. at 425, p. 21.
The court had already allowed Raymond the expenses he reported on a monthly
basis due to having the marital debts. See, e.g., R. 428, Exhibit 5, p. 4; Addendum P to
Appellant's Brief at 4; R. 368, p. 4; Addendum I to Appellant's Brief at p. 4. On
Exhibit 5 Raymond had reported a monthly expense for marital debt of $424.52. If
anything, the court reduced marital debt by awarding all of the undivided marital assets
to Raymond. He was awarded $25,000.00 of cash for the purpose of paying marital
debt. See, e.g., R. 368, p. 2; Addendum I to Appellant's Brief at p. 2. He was also
awarded the $8,000.00 Marriott time share. See, e.g., R. 368, p. 3; Addendum I to
Appellant's Brief at p. 3.
The court makes no findings to show how it was equitable to allow Raymond
$900 a month for expenses when there was no evidence at trial that Raymond was in
need of such an amount. He only requested $424.52 for expenses and the court
allowed this amount as well over and above the $900 allowed by the court sua sponte.
See, e.g., R. at 425, p. 21; R. 428, Exhibit 5, p. 4; Addendum P to Appellant's Brief at
4.
The well-settled standard for setting traditional alimony has been articulated by
the Utah Supreme Court as follows:
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The most important function of alimony is to provide
support for the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of
living she enjoyed during the marriage, and to prevent the
wife from becoming a public charge. 55 ... [T]hree factors
must [ ] be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony
award:
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the wife;
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient
income for herself; and
[3] the ability of the husband to provide support.
Failure to consider the Jones factors in fashioning an alimony award
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the trial court must make
sufficiently detailed findings of fact on each factor to enable a reviewing
court to ensure that the trial court's discretionary determination was
rationally based upon these three factors. If sufficient findings are not
made, we must reverse unless the record is clear and uncontroverted
such as to allow us to apply the Jones factors as a matter of law on appeal.
Bell, 810 P.2d at 491-92 (emphasis added and citations omitted). This Court has
further explained the importance of detailed findings on the Jones factors as follows:
We emphasize that it is not enough for the trial court to make conclusory
findings that one party has need and the other the ability to pay. Rather, the
trial court's findings on each factor '"should ... include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion
on each factual issue was reached.' " Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, ^f
6,974 P.2d 306. For example, under the first factor, needs of the receiving
spouse, the trial court must provide a monthly amount and "explain how it
arrived at the monthly amount, or at least from the record, allow us to
make this determination ourselves." Rehn, 1999 UT App 41 at ^f 7 (citation
omitted). Under the second factor, the trial court should specify the
receiving spouse's established monthly income and "consider the
'historical roles' both parties played in the marriage," i.e., whether one
party "was the primary caretaker of the parties' minor children." Id. at ^f 9.
Under the third factor, the trial court cannot simply state the obligor's
earnings. See id. at If 10. "To be sufficient the findings should also
address [the obligor's] needs and expenditures, such as housing,
payment of debts, and other living expenses." Id.
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McKenzie v. McKenzie, 2001 UT App 106, lj 1, 2001 WL 333089 (emphasis added and
some citations omitted). In particular, the trial court needs to "fully spell[] out its
assumptions, adjustments, and calculations" when determining the income of the
parties. See Peterson v. Peterson, 2001 UT App 51,12, WL 312145. The trial court
erred in allowing a $900 expense for Raymond, and this Court should remand for
appropriate findings related to Raymond's expenses.
Further, the court made inadequate findings to show how it determined the value
of the vehicle in Linda's possession was $15,000.00 in the face of a blue book valuation
of less than $11,000.00 and a debt on the vehicle of $5,400.00. See e.g., R. 427, p.
1136,11.9-25; R. 428, Exhibit 24.
2. Distribution of marital debts and assets. The general rule regarding the
distribution of marital property is that "[e]ach party is presumed to be entitled all of his
or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." Bradford, 1999 UT
App 373 at Tf 26. Although it is within the discretion of the trial court to distribute
martial property unequally, it can only do so when it" 'memorializes in commendably
detailed findings' the exceptional circumstances supporting its distribution." Id. \ 27
(emphasis added and citation omitted). Thus, unequal distributions cannot be made
lightly, and are only justified when there are exceptional circumstances described in
commendable detail. The trial court's findings related to the distribution of marital
property do not reflect exceptional circumstances, nor are they set forth in detail.
Moreover, the evidence in the record related to the parties' debts and assets is far from
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"clear and uncontroverted," and this Court should reverse and remand for detailed
findings. See Bell, 810 P.2d at 492.
The evidence presented at trial regarding the parties' debts included the
following:
Raymond testified that there was an MBNA account with a balance of
$21,795.00 (plus unspecified interest). R. at 427, pp. 47-49; see also Addendum P to
Appellant's Brief at 2. Raymond also testified that there was a checking account
overdraft from Deseret First with a balance of $1,802.12, which was a joint debt; a
Deseret First Visa account with a balance of $2,378.48, which was a joint debt; a
Deseret First account overdraft with a balance of $810.61, which was Raymond's debt;
a Deseret First Visa account with a balance of $2,010.16, which was Raymond's debt;
and an RC Willey account with a balance of $3,940.00, which was Raymond's debt. R.
at 427, pp. 50-51; see also Addendum P to Appellant's Brief at 2.
Linda submitted exhibits identifying an automobile loan with WFS Financial in
the amount of $5,313.38, an MBNA account balance of $9,320.59, an RC Willey
account balance of $1,919.07, a JC Penney account balance of $374.75, a Discover
Card account balance of nearly $5,000.00, and a Meier and Frank account balance of
about $427.00. See R. at 427, pp. 137-38; Addendum R to Appellant's Brief.
It is unclear from the findings if the court considered all of the debt as marital
and expected Raymond to pay what Linda incurred as well as what he incurred or if the
court defined marital as something else. It is not clear from the court's findings exactly
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what debts Raymond was to pay in what amounts. Linda presented debts of
approximately $22,250.00. Raymond testified as to approximately another $32,750.00
in debt. The total debts of the parties were $56,000. The total assets with the Marriott
and cash were $33,000. Raymond was awarded $25,000.00 of cash and the Marriott
valued by the court at $8,000.00. see e.g., R. 368, p. 2-3. The deficit when these assets
are offset by the total marital debt was $23,000.00. Linda was assigned $9,300.00 of
this amount. Raymond may have been assigned the remaining $13,700.00. But the
findings do not state how this was to work.
The evidence surrounding the parties' individual and marital debts in this case
was unclear and controverted. See, e.g., R. at 427, pp. 36-39, 47-52, 137-40, 171-78,
204-05, 230-33. The lack of clear and uncontroverted evidence magnifies the need for
detailed findings. See Bell, 810 P.2d at 492. But the trial court's written Findings of
Fact were not detailed:
The parties acquired debts and obligations during the course of the
marriage. Petitioner should be ordered to pay the Marriott card obligation,
which was transferred to an MBNA account, the Deseret Federal obligation
and all other marital debt, except the MBNA card in Respondent's name
with an approximate balance of $9,000.00.
Addendum I to Appellant's Brief at 3. At trial, the hearing, the trial court
order[ed] that the money being held in escrow [which amount was
$25,000.00] be applied entirely to pay to marital debts, and then I'm going
to order that [Raymond] pay the balance of any remaining marital debts.
And by debts I include the MBNA account which is $21,795 plus, the
Deseret Federal overdraft and the Deseret First Visa. I exclude credit cards
solely in [Linda's] name, those cards are her responsibility, or those debts
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are her responsibility. That would include the debt on the Jeep and also
the, there's another MBNA card.
R. at 427, p. 243. The main problem with these findings is that they fail to identify a
dollar amount for the parties' marital debt.
There is no way to know from a reading of the trial court's findings how much
debt was assigned to each party. This is crucial because the trial court distributed
property unequally, and allowed Raymond to include expenses of $1,324.52 per month
(which included the $900.00 temporary alimony payment) for installment payments
toward debts, based on the idea that Raymond was ordered "to pay off all of the debt
load." R. at 425, p. 21.
Even if Raymond was supposed to pay off all of the marital debts except the two
MBNA cards, he had much less debt than his expenses reflected during trial. However,
none of these specifics are addressed by the court. One could read the findings to allow
Raymond to pay off all debts in his name and default on all debts in Linda's name.. If
the amount of debt assigned to Linda was really $22,000.00 for the credit cards and
loans in her name and not just the $9,000.00 stated in the findings, then the result in this
case was extremely inequitable. Raymond would have been awarded all marital assets
to pay off all debt in his name, Linda was awarded all marital debt and no assets to
offset that deficit and Raymond had alimony reduced by both the $424.52 a month for
debts, which is the expense he requested at trial, and the additional $900.00 a month the
court gave him under the label of temporary alimony (later characterized as additional
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debt payment). R. at 425, p. 21; R. 428, Exhibit 5, p. 4; Addendum P to Appellant's
Brief at 4.
The possibility of this result was an abuse of discretion that should be reversed
and remanded for an equitable distribution supported by detailed findings.
3. Attorneys'fees.

In a 1999 case, in which a wife challenged the trial court's

denial of her request for attorneys' fees, this Court has held,
In a divorce action, "[b]oth the decision to award attorney fees and the
amount of such fees are within the sound discretion of the trial court."
However, the trial court's decision whether to award attorney fees
"must be based on evidence of the financial need of the receiving
spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of
the requested fees." A trial court's "failure to consider any of the
enumerated factors is ground for reversal on the fee issue."
In denying Ms. Davis's request for attorney fees, the trial court
entered no findings on the issue of attorney fees, but merely ordered that
each party should "assume his/her own costs and attorney's fees
incurred in prosecuting this action." Because the trial court failed to
address any of the factors cited above, we reverse and remand for
findings on each of the requisite factors.
Davis v. Davis, 1999 UT App 1, f 2, 1999 WL 33244684 (citations omitted); see also
Bellv. Bell, 810 P.2d 489,494 (Utah Ct. Appl 1991).
In the present case, Linda requested an award of attorneys' fees arguing that she
had a need and Raymond had an ability to pay. As in the Davis case, at the trial in the
present case, the court simply ruled, "I'm going to order that each party bear their own
attorney's fees

" R. at 427, p. 247. The trial court made no findings regarding

Linda's need, Raymond's ability to pay, or the reasonableness of the fee requested by
Linda.
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By failing to make the required findings, the trial court abused its discretion, and
this Court should reverse and remand for findings on each of the requisite factors. See
id.
4. Judgment for unpaid alimony. The trial court made no ruling regarding
Linda's request for a judgment against Raymond for unpaid alimony. The trial court
did rule that neither party would be held in contempt for failing to follow court orders.
R. at 427, p. 242. But Linda's request for contempt and her request for a judgment
against Raymond for unpaid temporary alimony are separate legal issues.
Linda requested the trial court to hold Raymond in contempt and to enter a
judgment against him for unpaid alimony from August through October, 2003. Even
though the court declined to hold Raymond in contempt, it should have granted Linda a
judgment. It was uncontested at trial that early in the proceedings, the court ordered
Raymond to pay Linda $1,400.00 in alimony. See Addendum E to Appellant's Brief at
T[ 12. In August 2003, Raymond moved into the marital home, after Linda moved out,
and for the next three months Raymond paid the mortgage in lieu of paying Linda
alimony. Linda received a mere $81.00 a month during this time. That arrearage was
never repaid and Linda requested judgment at the time of trial.
When Linda raised the issue, the trial court responded that Raymond "was given
leave [by Judge Hansen] to pay the mortgage payment instead of paying alimony." R.
at 425, p. 21. This finding by the trial court is incorrect. The only order that Judge
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Hansen signed in this case makes no mention of Raymond paying the mortgage in lieu
of alimony. See Addendum E to Appellant's Brief.
It was wrong for Raymond to unilaterally stop making his court-ordered alimony
payments to Linda, and it was error for the trial court to deny Linda's request for a
judgment against Raymond. There is no evidence for Linda to marshal that would
support the trial court's ruling that Raymond had leave to make the mortgage payment
in lieu of alimony. No such leave was ever granted. This Court should remand this
issue and direct the trial court to enter a judgment against Raymond and in favor of
Linda for the alimony payments that Raymond failed to make from August to
November 2003. See e.g., R. 427, p. 224,11. 3-6.
Point II
The Trial Court Did not Issue the Divorce Decree Based on the Fault of the Parties
Throughout the Appellee's Brief, Raymond argues that evidence of Linda's fault
and wrongdoing was presented at trial, that a trial court may consider the respective
fault of the parties in making its decisions, and that this decree was decided "on
equitable principles"—which Raymond seems to translate as meaning "based on
Linda's fault."
However, Raymond fails to cite any portion of the record where "evidence" of
Linda's fault was presented to the trial court. Moreover, there is nothing in the
Findings of Fact or the Decree of Divorce to suggest that the trial court considered the
fault of the parties when making its decisions. See Addenda H and I to Appellant's
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Brief. On the contrary, the Findings of Fact state that this was a no-fault divorce:
"Irreconcilable differences exist making it impossible to continue the marital
relationship." Addendum I to Appellant's Brief at If 3.
At trial, the court began its ruling by stating, "This is an effort to calculate and
do an equitable, make an equitable decision here and to get this case over there and get
both parties on their way." R. at 427, p. 242. The trial court does not state, or even
suggest, that either party is at fault in the matter or that its ruling is based on a
consideration of the fault of the parties. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(b) (2005).
Raymond's unsupported argument that the trial court should be affirmed because
the decree was decided on equitable principles—meaning, as he explains, based on
Linda's fault—is not supported by any of the court's findings. There is no basis given
by the court that would justify the court's inequitable results in distribution of property,
debts and the award of alimony.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to make sufficient findings of fact
that would support its conclusions in this divorce case. The trial court also erred by
failing to award Linda a judgment for unpaid alimony. In each instance, the trial court
committed reversible error that prejudiced Linda, and this case should be remanded to
the trial court for an equitable division of specific debts and an equal division of
property. Further this case should be reversed on the issue of alimony and the case
should be remanded with instructions to strike the $900.00 of expenses for temporary
alimony submitted to the court by Raymond and instructions to recalculate alimony
considering this additional income.
DATED this

~7

day of April 2006.

HlRSCHI CHRISTENSEN, PLLC

Steve S. Christensen
Attorney for Appellant/Respondent
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